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APPLICATION NO.	ON NO. FILING DATE		FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.		
09/853,226 05/11/2001		Geoffrey S. Strongin	2000.039300/TT3766	6345			
23720	7590	05/09/2006		EXAMINER			
		GAN & AMERSO	RIZZUTO, KEVIN P				
10333 RICHMOND, SUITE 1100 HOUSTON, TX 77042				ART UNIT PA	PAPER NUMBER		
•				2183			

DATE MAILED: 05/09/2006

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	Applicant(s)		
09/853,226	STRONGIN, GEOFFRE	STRONGIN, GEOFFREY S.		
Examiner	Art Unit			
Kevin P. Rizzuto	2183			

Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief	Examiner	Art Unit	
	Kevin P. Rizzuto	2183	
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED <u>24 April 2006</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS APP	PLICATION IN CONDITION FOR A	LLOWANCE.	
 The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or o this application, applicant must timely file one of the follo places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a No (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in comp following time periods: 	n the same day as filing a Notice o owing replies: (1) an amendment, a otice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in liance with 37 CFR 1.114. The repl	f Appeal. To avoid at ffidavit, or other evide compliance with 37 (ence, which CFR 41.31; or
a) The period for reply expiresmonths from the mailing of			
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advevent, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later the Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b)	an SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of	f the final rejection.	
MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f		\	unaian foa baya
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension a CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened stabove, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three month earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	and the corresponding amount of the fee. atutory period for reply originally set in the	The appropriate extension final Office action; or (2)	n fee under 37 as set forth in (b)
 The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in com of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any e Since a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must 	extension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to avoid dismissal (of the appeal.
AMENDMENTS			
 The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, (a) They raise new issues that would require further co (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below) 	nsideration and/or search (see NO		because
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in be appeal; and/or		educing or simplifying	the issues for
(d) They present additional claims without canceling a NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a))		jected claims.	
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.		ompliant Amendment	(PTOL-324)
5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s		omphant / anonamon	. (1 102 02 1).
 Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be a the non-allowable claim(s). 		, timely filed amendn	nent canceling
 For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is pro 		vill be entered and an	explanation of
The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:			
Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to:			
Claim(s) rejected: <u>1-15,35,41,42 and 53</u> .	· '		
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:			
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, because applicant failed to provide a showing of good ar and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e). 	ut before or on the date of filing a f nd sufficient reasons why the affida	vit or other evidence	not be entered is necessary
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessa	overcome <u>all</u> rejections under appe	al and/or appellant fa	ils to provide a
10. 🔲 The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation			
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	ut does NOT place the application	in condition for allows	ance because:
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered by See Continuation Sheet.			ance because;
12. ☐ Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s)13. ☐ Other:	. (P10/S8/08 or P10-1449) Paper	NO(\$)	

Applicant argues:

"Gafken is completely silent with regard to hardware debugging and therefore fails to teach or suggest enable bits for hardware debugging mode, as set forth in claims 1, 35, 41-42 and 53. Applicants also note that the Examiner has admitted that Gafken does not teach or suggest enable bits for a hardware debugging mode.

Yishay states that original equipment manufacturers must be able to easily disable secured modes in order to debug programs in a data processing system. See Yishay, col. 1, lines 25-31. Accordingly, Yishay is concerned with debugging software and not hardware. Yishay is completely silent with regard to hardware debugging and therefore fails to teach or suggest enable bits for a hardware debugging mode, as set forth in claim 1, 35, 41-42, and 53."

The argument is not persuasive for the following reasons:

To begin, col. 1, lines 26-35 of Yishay is cited below.

"Additionally, the original equipment manufacturer must be able to easily disable the secured mode in order to debug the program in the data processing system. <u>As well</u>, a microcontroller manufacturer must also have an easy method to disable the secured mode to test the microcontroller before providing it to the original equipment manufacturer. Therefore, a method for disabling the secured mode must be easy enough to allow for debugging and testing, but still complex enough that an unauthorized user will not be able to break the code in a short period of time." (Emphasis added by Examiner)

Yishay states that there must be an easy method to disable the secured mode to test the microcontroller, i.e., hardware debugging. Therefore, Yishay is not "completely silent with regard to hardware debugging." Furthermore, to "debug the program in the data processing system" may be considered both software debugging (as stated by Applicant) and hardware debugging. Yishay is referring to program code stored in a memory such as a ROM, an EEPROM or a flash EPROM, for controlling a microcontroller. The program code controls the hardware, therefore, debugging the program code ensures the hardware is functioning properly, and thus, is hardware debugging.

Furthermore, Applicant is reminded that apparatus claims are defined by their claimed structure, and functional and/or intended use limitations do not further define the apparatus. The limitations in question for claims 1, 41 and 42, for example, "a first

register configured to store one or more enable bits <u>for a hardware debugging mode</u>, a first control logic coupled to receive a plurality of input signals <u>associated with the hardware debugging mode</u>", are functional limitations within an apparatus claim. See "MPEP 2114 [R-1] Apparatus and Article Claims — Functional Language" which is copied below for Applicant's convenience.

MPEP 2114 [R-1] Apparatus and Article Claims — Functional Language

APPARATUS CLAIMS MUST BE STRUCTUR-ALLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRIOR ART

>While features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally, claims< directed to >an< apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. >In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78, 44 USPQ2d 1429,1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The absence of a disclosure in a prior art reference relating to function did not defeat the Board's finding of anticipation of claimed apparatus because the limitations at issue were found to be inherent in the prior art reference); see also In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971);< In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 528, 531 (CCPA 1959). "[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does." Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original).

MANNER OF OPERATING THE DEVICE DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE APPARATUS CLAIM FROM THE PRIOR ART

A claim containing a "recitation with respect to the manner in which a claimed apparatus is intended to be employed does not differentiate the claimed apparatus from a prior art apparatus" if the prior art apparatus teaches all the structural limitations of the claim. Ex parte Masham, 2 USPQ2d 1647 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987) (The preamble of claim 1 recited that the apparatus was "for mixing flowing developer material" and the body of the claim recited "means for mixing..., said mixing means being stationary and completely submerged in the developer material". The claim was rejected over a reference which taught all the structural limitations of the claim for the intended use of mixing flowing developer. However, the mixer was only partially submerged in the developer material. The Board held that the amount of submersion is immaterial to the structure of the mixer and thus the claim was properly rejected.)

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